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nder strong pressures from the emerging public debt crisis, the European Council 
meeting  on  9  December  2011  discussed  the  incorporation  of  certain  aspects  of  a 
reinforced Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) into the EU Treaties. Only the United 
Kingdom  was  openly  opposed  to  the  proposal,  but  its  veto  effectively  blocked  the 
incorporation of the reinforced SGP rules into the EU Treaties, as unanimous support from 
all member states is required to bring about treaty change. This gave rise to the adoption on 
2 March 2012, by 25 member states (in addition to the UK, the Czech Republic opted out) of 
the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union 
(here shortened to Fiscal Stability Treaty). Once the requisite number of partners (12) had 
ratified it, the Fiscal Stability Treaty came into force in January 2013. 
The provisions of the Treaty may be summarised as follows: 
  The  budgetary  position  of  a  “contracting  party”  must  respect  a  country-specific 
medium-term  objective  as  defined  in  the  SGP  with  a  lower  limit  of  a  “structural 
deficit” of 0.5% of GDP but with the time-frame fixed with due account of country-
specific sustainability risks. 
  The lower limit for the structural deficit may be increased to 1% once the public debt 
is lower than 60% of GDP. 
  The speed of reduction of the deficit is fixed at one-twentieth of the gap between the 
actual deficit and the limit. 
  In  the  case  of  failure  on  behalf  of  a  contracting  party  to  comply  with  the 
recommendation,  a  procedure  may  be  launched  with  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the 
European Union (CJEU), which can impose a sanction not exceeding 0.1% of its GDP. 
The only really significant innovation contained in the Fiscal Stability Treaty is, in fact, to 
assign responsibility to the CJEU to decide whether a Member state should be sanctioned for 
having an excessive deficit.  
In  addition,  however,  the  Treaty  (in  Article  8)  stipulates  that  where,  on  the  basis  of  the 
Commission’s assessments, a country has failed to comply with its obligations, the “matter 
will be brought to the Court of Justice by one or more Contracting Parties”. And where a 
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Contracting Party, even independently of the Commission’s report, considers that another 
Contracting Party has failed to comply with the provisions, it may also bring the matter to 
the CJEU.  
The inter-governmental nature of the Fiscal Stability Treaty is also made evident by the fact 
that the Commission, despite its important role in the preparation of reports and conclusions 
as regards the existence of an excessive deficit, is not as such entitled to bring a case before 
the  Court  of  Justice.  However,  as  regards  the  eurozone  countries, Article  7  stipulates an 
“obligation” for the members to support the proposals or recommendations submitted by the 
European Commission where it considers that a eurozone member state is in breach of the 
deficit criterion in the excessive deficit procedure. This obligation, however, shall not apply if 
a qualified majority is opposed to the decision proposed or recommended. 
Another  issue,  however,  is  the  extent  to  which the  Treaty,  due  to  its  inter-governmental 
nature,  can  be  expected  to  entail  a  modification  of  the  roles  of  the  EU  institutions  and, 
notably,  the  role  of  the  European  Parliament.  In  this  respect,  Article  13  of  the  Treaty 
stipulates  that  the  European Parliament  and  the  national  Parliaments  of  the  “contracting 
parties”  will  together  determine  the  organisation  and  promotion  of  a  conference  of 
representatives of the “relevant committees of the European Parliament and representatives 
of the relevant committees of national Parliaments in order to discuss budgetary policies and 
other issues covered by this Treaty”. 
What remains to be seen is, however, also the reality of legal procedures initiated when a 
“Contracting Party” actually makes use of the provisions in the Treaty and puts a case before 
the CJEU. At stake here is the interpretation by the Court of the provisions in Article 3 and, 
notably, how the Court will decide as regards the definition of the annual structural balance 
of the general government as being the “cyclically-adjusted balance net of one-off temporary 
measures”  and  even  more  the  definition  of  “exceptional  circumstances”  in  paragraph  3, 
point ‘b’. 
Under normal circumstances the Court cannot be expected to have the in-house expertise to 
arrive  at  an  “independent”  estimate  of  the  structural  budget  balance  of  the  country 
concerned and must therefore, at least initially, rely on the estimates of this balance prepared 
by the European Commission. However, the country brought before the Court, not least to 
avoid  paying  the  penalty  and  the  accompanying  stigmatism,  may  argue  that  the 
Commission’s estimates do not take full account of very “special circumstances”.  
In  order  to  arrive  at  a  balanced  conclusion,  the  Court  and  the  country  concerned  may 
therefore need to call in experts from outside and it cannot be excluded that, in the end, the 
Court’s decision will not support the Commission’s views or those of the Contracting Party 
having  brought  the  case  before  the  Court.  To  arrive  at  a  purely  judicial  definition  of  a 
“structural budget balance” and “special circumstances” might thus create a rather unique 
precedent. Decisions concerning such a key economic variable are typically the subject of 
deep economic cleavages and heated academic and political debate, but at the end of the day 
they  are  usually  left  to  the  validation  of  economists  and  policy-makers.  Due  to  the 
questionable  feasibility  of  this  procedure,  therefore,  one  must  conclude  that  this  inter-
governmental Treaty is unlikely to solve the fundamental problem of consistency between 
budgetary and monetary policy. 